UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-30-2016

Regan v. Owen Supplemental Appellant's Brief
Dckt. 43848

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Regan v. Owen Supplemental Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43848" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6601.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6601

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Supreme Court Docket No. 43848
Case No. CV-2011

136

BRENT REGAN and MOURA REGAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
JEFF D. OWEN and KAREN A. O\VEN, husband and wife,
Defendants/Respondents

APPELLANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofidaho
In and For the County of Kootenai
Honorable John P. Luster, Senior District Judge

Arthur B. Macomber
Macomber Law, PLLC
1900 Northwest Blvd., Suite 110
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Attorney for Appellants

Susan P. Weeks
James, Vernon, & Weeks, PA
1626 Lincoln Way
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Attorney for Respondents

Fl

PY

JUN 3 0 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

11

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE

...... 1

A) Nature of the Case ..................................................................................................................... 1
B) Course of the Proceedings on Appeal Regarding the Narrow Issue Presented ........................ 1
C) Statement of Facts ..................................................................................................................... 2
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................................. 3
ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF ............................................................... 4
ARGUtvfENT ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 4
A. Senate Bill 1388 Does Not Mandate Retroactivity, but this Court's Compliance ................. 5
B. The Enacted Language of Senate Bill 1388 Cannot be Applied Retroactively................... 13
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 39

TABLE OF CASES A1'D AUTHORITIES
Cases

Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818,214 P. 209 (1923) ................. 6, 14
Beecher v. Board ofSupervisors, 50 Iowa 538 (1879) ............................................... 14
Bellevue State Bank v. Lilya, 35 Idaho 270, 205 P. 893 (1922) ...................................... 13
BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 150 Idaho 93,244 P.3d 237 (2010) ................ 5
CDA Daily Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 299 P.3d 186 (2013) ................. .4
Engen v. James, 92 Idaho 690,448 P.2d 977 (1969) .................................................... 6
Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Bus. Rev., Inc., 146 Idaho 207, 192 P.3d 1031 (2008) ........ .11
Fidelity State Bk. v. North Fork H. Dist, 35 Idaho 797,209 P. 449 (1922) ..................... 6, 12
Griffith v. Owens, 30 Idaho 647, 166 P. 922 (1917) .................................................... 13
Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928,318 P.3d 918 (2014) ............................................ 9, 15
Idaho Schools for Equal Edu. Opportunity v. State, 140 Idaho 586, 97 P.3d 453 (2004) ........ 11
Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 718 P.2d 1129 (1986) .............................. 8
Lawrence v. Defenbach, 23 Idaho 78, 128 P. 81 (1912) ............................................... 13
Lincoln Cnty. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. ofMaryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632 P.2d 678 (1981) ........... 9
McCuskey v. Canyon Cnty. Comm 'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996) ........................ 15
Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Cmp., 113 Idaho 609, 747 P.2d 18 (1987) ................................ 9
Regan v. Jeff D., 339 P.3d 1162 (2014) (a.k.a. Regan v. Owen) .............................................. 1, 8
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35,232 P.3d 813 (2010) ....................................... 6, 7, 8, 10, 11
Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214, 254 P.3d 1210 (2011) .................................. 5
Wadsworth v. Idaho Dep 't of Transp., 128 Idaho 439, 915 P.2d 1 (1996) ......................... 15
Washington County v. Paradis, 38 Idaho 364,222 P. 775 (1923) .................................... 14
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) ........................................................ 15

. . . .. 7, 1
Idaho Code section 1773 (191
4
Code section 5-224 ....... .
Code sec1:mn
Idaho Code section 63-1009 .............................................................................................. 1,
Idaho Code section 67-510 ............................................................................................................ 8
Idaho Code section 67-511. .. ............................................................................ 13
Idaho Code section 73-101 ............................................................................................................ 8
Idaho Session Laws

1911 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 10 ........................................................................ 6, 7
2016 Idaho Session Laws, ch. 273 (a.k.a. Senate Bill 1388aa) .................................. passim
Other Authorities
Report of the Idaho Attorney General for 1911-1912 ................................................. 7, 14
2 Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., sec. 641. .............................................. 13

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 ................................................................................................... 1
Idaho Appellate Rule 20......... . . . . . . ............................................................................ 2
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ..................................................................................... 38
Idaho Constitution
Idaho Const., art. I, § 15 ................................................................................................................ 14
Idaho Const., art. II, § 1 ................................................................................................................ 10
Idaho Const., art. III, § 22 ............................................................................................................... _8
Idaho Const., art. V, § 13 ........................................................................................................ 11, 12
Idaho Const., art. I, § 13 ............................................................................................................ 2, 23
Idaho Const., art. XI,§ 12 ....................................................................................................... 14, 15

11

SUPPLEMENTAL

This appeal is about whether a County's issuance

a tax deed for a parcel ofreal property

in Idaho wipes out all vested easements on the property pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-1009,
including prescriptive easements. Appellants Brent and Moura Regan ("Regan") claim the
issuance of a tax deed does not eliminate prior vested easements. Respondents Jeff and Karen
Owen ("Owen") argue the language of the statute sho\vs the issuance of a tax deed to a County
disposes of prior "encumbrances," which Owens argue and in which contention the trial court
agreed includes easements. Regan's timely filed March, 2016 Appellant's Brief provides lengthier
exposition on the facts of this case.
In its opinion filed October 9, 2015, the trial court in this case held

favor of Owens that

pursuant to Idaho Code 63-1009 vested easements are eliminated by a tax deed conveyance of the
sen1ient estate, and thus that the Tax Deed to

Orphan Parcel eliminated Regans' claim to a

prescriptive easement across that Orphan Parcel. C.R. 69-77. The trial court entered a final
judgment on October 30, 2015, and this appeal followed. C.R. 78-80.
The narrow issue argued in this Supplemental Brief is whether wholly, or to some pai--tial
extent the Idaho Legislature's passage and the Governor's signing of Senate Bill number 1388 on
March 30, 2016 applies retroactively to the issues on appeal. Regans argue it does not so apply,
but that this Court may account for the legislature's intent in reaching a decision.
B)

Course of the Proceedings on Appeal Regarding the Narrow Issue Presented.

On December 10, 2014, the district court entered a partial judgment certified as final under
Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.). Clerk's Record on Limited Appeal
18. Owen appealed, and on December 18, 2014, this Court filed

opinion. Regan v. Jeff

1

V.

on
easement over
On August

2015, Owens' filed their third motion for summary judgment focusing on the

prescriptive easement issue. C.R. 34. In its opinion filed October 9, 2015, the trial court ruled in
Owens' favor that the Tax Deed to the Orphan Parcel eliminated Regans' claim to a prescriptive
easement. C.R. 69-77. The trial court entered a final judgment on October 30, 2015. C.R. 78-80.
On December 10, 2015, Regans filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's judgment.
C.R. 81-85. On January 27, 2016, Regans filed an amended Notice of Appeal from the trial court's
December 17, 2015 amended final judgment. C.R. 90-94.
This Supplemental Brief is filed by Regan in response to this Court's denial on May 23,
2016 of the parties' Stipulation on Appeal for Entry of an Order. Ord. Ref. No. 16-200 (May 23,
2016). The Order denying the Stipulation provided 35 days for this Supplemental Brief to be filed,
which date was calculated to be Monday, June 27, 2016. Id. Pursuant to the second sentence of
Idaho Appellate Rule 20, this Supplemental Brief is certified to be timely filed.
C)

Statement of Facts

The Court is aware of the facts of this case, but a brief iteration of select facts related to the
narrow issue addressed in this Supplemental Brief is provided here. Regans o\vn a 50.55-acre
parcel in Kootenai County. C.R. 25. Abutting their parcel to the east is a 10.7-acre parcel owned
by Owens. C.R. 25. Owens acquired their property through two separate conveyances. They
acquired a 10.3-acre parcel from David and Helen Hanna by the \Varranty Deed recorded in
Kootenai County as Instrument No. 1781225 on February 11, 2003 (the "Owen Parcel"). C.R. 25.
Later, Owens acquired a 0.4-acre parcel from Kootenai County by tax deed recorded in Kootenai

2

on

28,

the

was inadvertently created when the Original Grantors of these various lands deeded to the
Marchelli Trust in April 1999. A.R. 464. The Original Grantors never conveyed the Orphan Parcel,
and thus did not reserve an easement across it ( as they did when conveying the other parcels).

An existing gravel roadway extends west from the corner of Bonnell Road to the Regans'
property. The roadway passes through the Orphan Parcel using much of its area. A.R. 275; 28385. The roadway existed when Regans purchased the property from the Marchelli Trust in March
of 1999, being used since that time by Regans. A.R. 280.
The Original Grantors did not pay the real property taxes assessed against the Orphan
Parcel. As a result, in 2004 the Kootenai County Treasurer issued a tax deed conveying the Orphan
Parcel to Kootenai County (the "Tax Deed"). R. 67-68. Respondent Jeff Owen purchased the
Orphan Parcel from Kootenai County by a County Deed recorded

Kootenai County as

Instrument No. 1997638 on November 28, 2005. R. 69-70. Jeff Owen then deeded the Orphan
Parcel to Jeff D. Owen and Karen A. Owen, husband and wife, using a \Varranty Deed recorded
in Kootenai County as Instrument No. 2294085000 on December 9, 2010. A.R. 409-10.
STAil\1DARD OF REVIEW

The narrow issue addressed by this Supplemental Brief raises both statutory interpretation
and constitutional issues. The CDA Dai1y Queen, Inc. case provides the standard of review:
'Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law over which [the Idaho State Supreme] Court exercises free
review.' Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40,232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010); citing
Federated Publ'ns, Inc v. Idaho Bus. Rev., Inc., 146 Idaho 207,210, 192
P .3d 1031, 1034 (2008). 'The party challenging a statute or ordinance on
constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute or
ordinance is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of
3

CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379,382,299 P.3d 186, 189 (2013).
ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Whether Senate Bill number 1388, as amended, which was passed in 2016 by the SixtyThird Idaho Legislature in its Second Regular Session and signed by Governor Otter on March 30,
2016 applies retroactively to the issues on appeal here, and, if not, what "effect the legislation has
as to this case." Ord. Denying Stip. For Entry of an Order Ref. No. 16-200 (May 16, 2016).
ARGUMENT
Introduction

Senate Bill 1388, as amended, was signed into law by Governor Otter on March 30,
2016. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 at 750, eff. Mar. 30, 2016. To facilitate ease ofreading in
this Supplemental Briefs text, but not

citations, Regan refers hereinafter to that enacted Act

as Senate Bill 1388. That ten (10) page Senate Bill as enacted is attached to this Supplemental
Brief as Exhibit A.
Regan's argument will examine the specific language of Senate Bill 1388 as enacted to
determine whether the legislature meant it to be applied retroactively, then why pursuant to
Idaho law and regardless of legislative intent Senate Bill 1388 cannot be applied retroactively,
and thus why this Court does not have to consider any retroactive effect of Senate Bill 1388 on
this case, except as this Court finds that Senate Bill may help this Court interpret Idaho Code
section 63-1009 to reach a final ruling.

4
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2

17,254
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Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 150 Idaho 93, 95,244 P.3d 237,239 (2010).

such an

undertaking, which is not argued to differ from the interpretation of enacted session laws:
The statute is viewed as a whole, and the analysis begins with the
language of the statute, which is given its plain, usual and ordinary
meaning. In determining the ordinary meaning of the statute, effect must
be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be
void, superfluous, or redundant. However, if the language of the statute is
capable of more than one reasonable construction it is ambiguous, and a
statute that is ambiguous must be construed with legislative intent in mind,
which is ascertained by examining not only the literal words of the statute,
but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind
the statute, and its legislative history.
(Citations omitted).
Senate Bill 1388's Section 1 provides, in pertinent part, the legislature's intent and policy
behind the statute:
It is the intent of the Legislature to clarify the scope and effect ofldaho's
statutes governing tax deeds .... It was never the intent of the Legislature
to allow local governments to destroy valid property interests held by third
parties in land that is subject to a sale or other conveyance based on a tax
delinquency, except where notice and opportunity to cure is provided
under the statute. Doing so would constitute an uncompensated taking of
property under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States
Constitution. The Legislature would never have intended such a result and,
by this legislation, makes that clear. As its context should have made
evident, the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, and the other
referenced sections, has always been to convey title absolutely free and
clear ofliens and mortgages of a monetary nature. It was never the intent
of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to convey more
than the delinquent taxpayer owned and thereby to destroy valid property
interests held by others without notice and an opportunity to cure. This
clarification brings the interpretation of Idaho's tax deed statute into line
with the interpretation of similar statutes in other jurisdictions, as had
always been the Legislature's intent

5

6

§ 1 at

1; see

at 1. The

was

statutes
tax

states

a

to

absolutely free and clear of liens and mortgages of a monetary nature." Id. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized language in the previous sentence is in the nature of clarifying language, i.e.,
"what I meant to say was," and not language indicating an intent to have a retroactive effect on
previous tax deed conveyance transactions.
In Idaho, "a retroactive statute is one that changes the legal effect of previous transactions
or events." Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43,232 P.3d 813,821 (2010); citing Engen v. James,
92 Idaho 690,695,448 P.2d 977, 982 (1969). "The inhibitions of the state and federal
constitutions with regard to impairing the obligations of contracts extend to contracts made by a
state or municipal corporation." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818, 819,
214 P. 209,210 (1923); citing Fidelity State Bk v. North ForkH Dist., 35 Idaho 797,209 P. 449
(1922). Further, and disagreeing with the District Court's ruling in this case, Senate Bill 1388
makes it clear "[i]t was never the intent of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to
convey more than the delinquent taxpayer owned and thereby to destroy valid property interests
held by others without notice and an opportunity to cure." Id. at 750-51 ( emphasis added).
The language of Section 1 avers merely to clarify the permanent intent of the legislature, such
intent being confirmed to extend back to the original dates of the tax deed conveyance statutes.
Support for this legislative contention is in Idaho's Session Laws of 1911, when statutes
governing the process of redemption by a delinquent taxpayer prior to the conveyance and sale
by a local governmental entity were amended. Those Session Laws amended Idaho Code section
1773, and part of its language after amendment stated, "Upon the payment of the money
specified ... , and the giving of the deed aforesaid by the treasurer, any deed or certificate of sale
6

interest

911- 9

1911

0 at

re:

§

(1911), This accords with Senate Bill 1388's Section I language where it states, "[i]t was never

the intent of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to convey more than the
delinquent taxpayer owned," because since at least 1911 what a county owned upon seizing a
property for taxes was never more than "all right, title, and interest acquired by the county under
or by virtue of the tax sale .... " LC. § 1773 (1911). Because a delinquent taxpayer could not
own property interests in his land belonging to others, such as easements appurtenant, a county
would never acquire such property interests belonging to others when it seized the delinquent
taxpayer's property for nonpayment. I. C. § 55-101 (3) (definition of real property includes "that
which is appurtenant to land"). Therefore, when the 2016 legislature stated it never intended the
seizure of real property to pay delinquent taxes "to destroy valid property interests held by
others," that contention has support in the Idaho Code as amended in 1911. 2016 Idaho Sess.
Laws, ch. 273 § lat 750-51; see Exhibit A at 1. This accords with the legislature's 2016
contention that "the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, ... has always been to convey title
absolutely free and clear ofliens and mortgages of a monetary nature," and not to "destroy valid
property interests held by others." Id. (Emphasis added).
Therefore, at least regarding the Section 1 language of Senate Bill 13 88, the resulting
statutory amendments should not be construed to be retroactive to affect past transactions. Stuart,
149 Idaho at 43,232 P.3d at 821. However, neither the legislature's disclaimers nor claims in
Section 1 satisfy the inquiry, and retroactivity may still be the effect of the 2016 law.
Section 8 of Senate Bill 13 8 8 as enacted states:

7

emergency existing therefor,
exist, this act shall
full

legislation. In any event, the ~~,~.u.,~,
amendments shall be interpreted to apply to any and all conveyances by
tax deed, past or future.
2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit

at 10.

The first sentence is a common emergency clause allowed by both the Idaho Constitution
and Idaho statutes. Idaho Const. Art. III § 22 ("No act shall take effect ... , except in case of
emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of the law"); LC.
§ 67-510 ("No act shall take effect ... , except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be
declared in the preamble or body of the law.") The legislature certainly has this "decisionmaking function that is uniquely legislative." Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691,
695, 718 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1986). Regans argue this sentence does not affect the issue of
retroactivity, because with it the law is only

full force and effect on and after its passage and

approval." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10. The first sentence
does not trigger retroactive application of the amended statutes.
The second sentence of Senate Bill 1388's Section 8 disclaims retroactivity and gives the
legislature's opinion: "Being a clarification of existing law, the Legislature does not view the
application of this amendment to prior conveyances as retroactive legislation." Id. This sentence
appears to be another way of the legislature stating, "what actually happened in those prior
conveyances was what we declare here by our clarification to be what happened, and not what the
Court apparently believed we meant when it gave its guidance to the District Court in the case of

Regan v. Owen in 2014." Pursuant to this Court's definition, "a retroactive statute is one that
changes the legal effect of previous transactions or events." Stuart, 149 Idaho at

232 P.3d at

821. Idaho Code section 73-101 provides, "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
8

so

,,

sentence

an
same sentence

If the statute is not retroactive, how can it apply to prior conveyances?
Senate Bill 1388 amended several statutes, including the Idaho Code section 63-1009 at
issue here on appeal. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 7 at 758; see Exl1ibit A at 10. "With
amendments to statutes, this Court has stated that they will not be deemed retroactive in application
absent an express legislative statement to the contrary." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938,
318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014); citing Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft C01p., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d
18, 23 (1987). In this case, the legislature does not desire to change the contractual tenns of prior
conveyances made by tax deeds, but would simply like to clarify that the property conveyed by a
local government entity to a third-party using a tax deed could only include the property that entity
was able to previously seize from the delinquent taxpayer. It is m1lc11own whether any purchaser at
a tax sale ever believed a conveying local government entity could sell property it did not own,
and Regan finds no Idaho case law on that point.

"It is the long standing rule in this [S]tate that when the legislature amends a statute it is
deemed, absent an express indication to the contrmy, to be indicative of changed legislative
intent." Nebeker, 113 Idaho at 614, 747 P.2d at 23 (emphasis added); see also, Lincoln Cnty. v.

Fid. & Deposit Co. ofMmyland, 102 Idaho 489,491,632 P.2d 678, 680 (1981) ("'When a statute
is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that
accorded to it before the amendment.") Certainly changed legislative intent would be found if the
legislature expressly commanded its amendments be applied retroactively. However, in this case
the legislature appears to expressly disclaim an intent to trigger retroactivity while expressly

9

intent \Vas

to clarify

law

to

6

can
13 88 to clarify various statutes by amending them, because Section 1 of that Senate Bill states, "It
is the intent of the Legislature to clarify the scope and effect of Idaho's statutes governing tax
deeds." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 1 at 750, see Ex. A, p. 1. Thus, in the first sentence of
Section 1 and the second sentence of Section 8, here the latter found at Exhibit A, p. 10, the
legislature declares its intent to merely clarify the law, and not to have retroactive effect so as to
"change[] the legal effect of previous transactions or events." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43,232 P.3d at
821 (defining retroactivity). Therefore, Senate Bill 1388 should not be found by this Court to be
retroactive pursuant to reasonable interpretation of the first two sentences of its Section 8, however
the third sentence remains to be analyzed.
The third sentence of Senate Bill 1388's Section 8 states, "fa any event, the Legislature
expressly intends that these amendments shall be interpreted to apply to any and all conveyances
by tax deed, past or future." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10. The
words "shall be interpreted" effectively confirm the legislature's intent that the legislation is not
made to be retroactive, but instead that the legislature expressly intends this Court to interpret the
amendments according to the legislature's opinion regarding the intent behind its clarification of
the law. Id. Fortunately, this is impossible, because the legislature lacks such power.
Section 1 of Article II of Idaho's Constitution states the separation of powers doctrine:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly
or
10

does not

to
or

a

to
to exercise the judicial power. Regan understands the indented paragraph above to stand for the
proposition that not only may the legislature not exercise the judicial power, but that the legislature
cannot direct the judiciary in how to exercise that power. Id.
As stated in the Idaho Schools case, "[t]he legislature shall have no power to deprive the
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction wl1ich rightly pertains to it as a coordinate
department of the government .... " Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State,
140 Idaho 586, 590, 97 P.3d 453, 457 (2004); citing Idaho Const., Art. V § 13. Regan argues the
legislature's command to this Court to exercise its power in a particular way would be an
unconstitutional deprivation by the legislature of this Court's pm:ver. Idaho Const., Art. V § 13.
Therefore, while it may be helpfal to this Court upon reflection to have the legislature's opinion
as to whether the new statute is merely a clarification of existing law or retroactive legislation,
laVvful or not, the fact remains "[b ]oth constitutional questions and questions of statutory
interpretation are questions of law over which [the Idaho State Supreme] Court exercises free
review." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 40, 232 P.3d at 818; citing Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Bus.

Rev., Inc., 146 Idaho 207,210, 192 P.3d 1031, 1034 (2008).
The third sentence of Senate Bill 1388's Section 8 uses the words "shall be interpreted" to
command this Court to agree with the legislature when this Court concludes its exercise of its
judicial power to interpret statutes. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10.
However, because the legislature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its inherent judicial
power, it does not appear to Regan and Regan does not argue the legislature may instruct this
Court on how to exercise its judicial power, in this case the power of statutory interpretation in a
11

to

the

statute. Idaho

the
The legislature appears to co1Tuuand this Court precisely how to exercise its judicial power when
the iegislature uses the word "shall," and Regan believes this Court may and should ignore that
command and make its ovm interpretation of "these [Senate Bill 1388] amendments." 2016 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10.
Therefore, the express language of Senate Bill 1388, both in Sections 1 and 8 do not
indicate the legislature intended the statute to be retroactive in its application to tax deed
conveyance transactions such that either local government entities or third party purchasers would
have their then existing property transactions altered, but instead the legislature's intent was to
command this Court to exercise its interpretive power in a particular way if those transactions ever
came before the Court. The legislature cannot command this Court how to exercise its judicial
power, and thus this Court -· ..·-···- free to decide whether the legislature intended to merely clarify
the law.
In this case, if the Court agrees Senate Bill 1388 merely clarifies the law it would mean
"the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, has always been to convey title absolutely free and
clear ofliens and mortgages of a monetary nature[, but that] it was never the intent of the legislature
to allow a local governmental entity to convey more than the delinquent taxpayer owned and
thereby to destroy valid property interests held by others." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 1 at
750-51; see Exhibit A at 1. Regan argues Senate Bill 1388 should not be applied retroactively to
this case, but that this Court may upon reflection interpret the amendatory language according to
the legislative intent to merely clarify the law.

12

not

s

case.

B. The Enacted Language of Senate Bill 1388 Cannot be Interpreted to be Retroactive.

\Vhenever two constructions of a statute are possible, and one construction would be
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional construction will be adopted.
Lawrence v. Defenbach, 23 Idaho 78, 128 P. 81 (1912); see 2 Sutherland on Statutory

Construction, 2d ed., sec. 641; Bellevue State Bank v. Lilya, 35 Idaho 270, 273, 205 P. 893, 896
(1922); Griffith v. Owens, 30 Idaho 647,650, 166 P. 922,925 (1917). To interpret Senate Bill 1388
as requiring a retroactive application would be unconstitutional in Idaho.
Idaho Code section 67-511 states:
Vlhere a section or part of a statute is amended, it is not to be considered
as having been repealed and reenacted in the amended form; but the
portions which are not altered are to be considered as having been the law
from the
when they were enacted and the new provisions are to be
considered as having been enacted at the time of the amendment.
In this case, Idaho Code section 63-1009 was amended by both strikeouts and additions of
language. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 7 at 757-58, see Ex. A, p. 10. Specifically stricken
was the following italicized language at issue in this case stating the deed conveys "absolute title
to the land described therein, J,-ee of all encumbrances except mortgages of record .... " Id. The

italicized language added to section 63-1009 confirms the legislature's intent that "[t]he deed
conveys to the grantee the right, title, and interest held by the record owner or owners, provided
that the title conveyed by the deed shall be fi'ee ofany recorded purchase contract, mortgage, deed
of trust, security interest, lien, or lease, so long as notice has been sent to the party in interest ..

.. " Id. The italicized language in the immediately preceding sentence carries the same language
found in Idaho Code section 1

as amended in the year 1911, viz., "all right, title, and interest
13

tax
at

1

,,

ceases
10 at

re:

§ l

1
In 2016, the legislature mirrored the language used in 1911, which both supports the
legislature's contention that Senate Bill 1388 is merely a clarification of the law, and that the
legislature recognizes the impossibility of retroactively altering a tax deed conveyance. This is
especially true for the purposes of this case, where the district court is claimed to have erred by
one party (Regan), and where in this appeal this Court is being asked to reach a final decision
regarding that error.
Section 16 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution states in pertinent part, "No ... law
impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed." This bar is reiterated and then extended
in Idaho's Constitution by Section 12 of Article Xl, where it states, "[t]he legislature shall pass no
law for the benefit of ... any individual, or association of individuals retroactive in its operation,
or which imposes on the people of any county or municipal subdivision of the state, a new liability
in respect to transactions or considerations already past." "The obligation of a contract is impaired
by a statute which alters its terms, by imposing new conditions or dispensing with existing
conditions, or which adds new duties or releases or lessens any part of the contractual obligation
or substantially defeats its ends." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818, 822,
214 P. 209,213 (1923).
Specifically regarding contracts to convey real property by tax deed, "[ w]here a
conveyance is made by the county to a third person the transaction rests upon contract which
cannot be impaired by legislative enactment, the purchaser from the county having acquired a
vested right." Washington County v. Paradis, 38 Idaho 364, 369, 222 P. 775, 780 (1923); citing
Beecher v. Board of Supervisors, 50

538 (1879). "[A] county does not acquire a vested right
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The second part of Section 12 of Article XI of Idaho's Constitution is also very important
to this case, because local government entities in Idaho may have significant financial liability if
Senate Bill 1388 is NOT applied retroactively. That Section 12's second part states, "[t]he
legislature shall pass no law

. . which imposes on the people of any county or municipal

subdivision of the state, a new liability in respect to transactions or considerations already past"
Idaho Const, Art. XI§ 12. If this Court does not construe Senate Bill 1388 to apply retroactively,
new liabilities may arise to local public entities that have conveyed tax. deeds for servient estates
for appurtenant easements. Dominant estate holders of destroyed appurtenant easements would
likely claim a taking of their real property interest had occurred. Therefore, Section 12 of Article
XI of Idaho's Constitution bars the legislature from passing a law that would impose on the people
of a local government entity a new liability in respect to prior conveyances by tax deed. These new
liabilities may arise related to tax deed transactions that occurred during the four-year period
preceding this Court's final decision. LC.§ 5-224 (statute oflimitations for inverse condem.11ation).
"A statute of limitations may bar a constitutional right" Guzman v. Piercy, 15 5 Idaho 928,
940,318 P.3d 918,930 (2014); see Wadsworth v. Idaho Dep 't ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439,442,915
P.2d 1, 4 (1996); citing United States v. Didinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); see also AfcCuskey v.

Canyon Cnty. Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 215-18, 912 P.2d 100, 102-05 (1996) (holding that an
inverse condemnation action was barred by the four-year statute oflimitation in LC. § 5-224).
To preserve the vested rights arising in both a purchaser of a servient estate and the vested
rights residing in a nearby dominant estate holder when a tax deed sale happens, such a sale must
be governed by the law in force at the time of sale, and callc11ot be affected by subsequent
15
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but this Court has the interpretive power to overturn the District Court's error, so that vested rights
are not destroyed and liability claims against local governmental entities do not arise.

CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 1388 was enacted in 2016. Its amendments were expressly made to be "in full
force and effect on and after its passage and approval," and it was thereafter passed by the
legislature and approved by the Governor on March 30, 2016. Even if its language could be
construed to require retroactive application, the legislature lacks the power to command this
Court to find it thus, and the Idaho Constitution bars such application. This Court should
conclude the amending language merely serves to clarify, in this case, Idaho Code section 631009, by accounting for legislative intent when it decides this case.
Respectfully submitted this _ _ _ day ofJune, 2016.

Arthur B. Macomber, Macomber Law, PLLC
1900 Northwest Blvd., Suite 110
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Attorney for Appellants Regan
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Session -
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IN
SENATE BILL NO. 1388, As J\~rrteDded
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
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12

AN ACT
RELJ\.TING TO TAX DEEDS; PROVIDING LEGISLATIVE INTENT; AMENDING SECTION
31-808, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE NONAPPLICATION TO EASEMENTS, HIGHWAYS,
AND RIGHTS-OF-WAY OWNED BY THE COUNTY, UNLESS EXPRESSLY CONVEYED AND TO
JV.LA.KE A TECHNICJl.L CORRECTION; .AMENDING SECTION 43-714A, IDAHO CODE, TO
FURTHER DEFINE THE TERM "PARTY IN INTEREST"; AMENDING SECTION 43-720,
IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE WHAT A TJ\~X DEED CONVEYS; AMENDING SECTION 50-1823,
IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE WHAT A T.A.X DEED CONVEYS; AMENDING SECTION 63-201,
IDAHO CODE, TO FURTHER DEFINE THE TERM "PARTY IN INTEREST" AND TO MAKE
TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AMENDING SECTION 63-1009, IDJl"HO CODE, TO REVISE
WHAT A TAX DEED CONVEYS; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING APPLIG\.TION.
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Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
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SECTION 1. LEGISLJi.TIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the
slature to
clari
the scope and effect of Idaho's statutes governing tax deeds. In
the case of Regan v. Owen, the Idaho Supreme Court: addressed whether a tax
deed issued pursuant to Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, has the effect of extinshing an otherwise valid private easement across the subject property.
Similar
slative language exists with respect to counties
Section
31-808, Idaho Code, with
to irrigation entities in Section 43-720,
Idaho Code, and with re
to cities in Section 50-1823, Idaho Code. The
court did not decide the issue, but remanded to a lower court. The lower
court subsequently ruled that, despite the harsh result, the statute has
this effect. While a private access easement was at issue there, the reasoning would also result in the elimination of public utility easements,
ditch rights, public highways and rights-of-way, conservation easements,
and all manner of third-party rights in the land including, for example,
interests of remainderrnen following a life estate.
this legislation, the
Idaho Legislature rejects that conclusion. It was never the intent of the
Legislature to allow local governments to destroy valid property interests
held by third parties in land that is subject to a sale or other conveyance
based on a tax delinquency, except where notice and opportunity to cure is
under the statute.
Doing so would constitute an uncompensated
of
under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States
Constitution. The
slature would never have intended such a result and,
by this legislation, makes that clear. As its context should have made evident, the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, and the other referenced
sections, has always been to convey title absolutely free and clear of liens
and mortgages of a monetary nature. It was never the intent of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to convey more than the delinquent
taxpayer owned and thereby to destroy valid property interests held by others wi t:hout notice and an
to cure. This clarification
the
interpretation of Idaho's tax deed statute into line with the interpretation
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SECTION 2. That Section 31-808, Idaho Code, be, and the same is
amended to read as follows:
31-808.
SALE OF COUNTY PROPERTY -- GENE~Zl..L PROCEDURE -- SJ\"LE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH TAX DEE;D -- ."'ROCEDURE AFTER ATTEMPTED AUCTION
EXCHANGE OF COUNTY PROPERTY -- SALE OF CERTAIN ODD-LOT PROPERTY -- SALE, EXCHANGE OR DONATION OF PROPERTY TO OTHER UNITS OF GOVERNMENT. ( 1) A board of
commissioners shall have the power and authority to sell or offer for
sale at public auction any real or personal property belonging to the county
not necessary for its use. :-iowever, personal property not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars ($250) in value may be sold at private sale without notice or public auction. Prior to offering the property for sale, the board
of county commissioners shall advertise notice of the auction in a newspaper, as defi::ied in section 60-106, Idaho Code, either published in the county
or having a general circulation in the
, not less than ten ( 10) calendar days prior to the auction. If the property to be sold is real property, the notice to be published shall contain the
description as well
as the street address of the
If the
is outside the corporate limits of a
and does not have a stree1: address, then the des
shall also contain the distance and direction of the location of the real
from the closest city.
If the
to be sold is acquired
tax deed, the notice
red
to be
shed shall include, next to the description of the property, the
of the
as it appears
tax certificate upon
which the tax deed was issued. The
shall be sold to the highest bidder. However, the board of
cormnissioners shall set the minimum bid
for the tax deeded property to include all property taxes owing, interest and
costs but they may reserve the right to reject any a:1d all bids and shall have
discretionary authority to reject or accept any bid which may be made for an
amount less than the total amount of all delinquent taxes, late charges, interest and costs, including other costs associated with the property, advertising, and sale, which may have accrued against any property so offered
for sale, including the amount specified in the tax deed to the county. Such
action by the board in setting the minimum bid shall be duly noted in their
minutes. Failure to do so shall not invalidate a sale. For tax deeded property, the board of county commissioners shall conduct an auction no later
than fourteen ( 14) months from the issuance of the tax deed.
( 2)
(a) Proceeds from the sale of
not
tax
deed shall be paid into the
treasury for the general use of the
cou:-ity.
(b) If the property to be sold has been acquired by tax deed, pursuant
to the provisions of chapter 10, title 63, Idaho Code, the proceeds from
the sale, after payment of all delinquent taxes, late charges, interest and costs, including the cost for ma
the property, shall
be apportioned by the board of county cornmissioners to parties in interest as defi::1ed in section 63-201, Idaho Code, and then to the owner(s) of
record of such
at the time the tax deed was issued on the prop-
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tax deeded
shall vJi thin
such sale and the amount of the excess
in interest shall re
to the board of county commissioners, within
( 60) days of receiving such notice, making claim on the proceeds.
No responses postmarked or received after the sixtieth day shall be
accepted. The board of
commissioners shall then make payment
to parties in interest in priority of the liens pursuant to law, within
sixty ( 60) days. All funds available after payment to parties in interest shall be returned to the owner ( s) of record of the property at the
time the tax deed was issued. All costs associated with the compliance
of this section shall be deducted from any amounts refunded to the parties in interest or owner ( s) of record.
(3) Any property sold may be carried on a recorded contract with the
county for a term not to exceed ten (10) years and at an interest rate not to
exceed the rate of interest specified in section 28-22-104 (1), Idaho Code.
The board of county commissioners shall have the authority to cancel any contract if the purchaser fails to comply with any of the terms of the contract
shall retain all payments made on the contract. The title to
sold on contract shall be retained in the name of the county
until full payment has been made by the purchaser. However, the purchaser
shall be responsible for payment of all property taxes during the period of
the contract.
( 4)
sale of property
the
shall vest in the purchaser al
of the right, title and interest of the county in the property, including
all delinquent taxes r,;::-,.ich that have
lien on the property since the
(c)
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( 5)

In addition to the purchase price, a purchaser of county property,
property acquired
tax deed, shall pay all fees required by law
for the transfer of property. No deed for any real estate purchased pursuant
to the provisions of this section shall be delivered to a purchaser until
such deed has been recorded in the county making the sale.
( 6) Should the county be unable to sell at a public auction any real or
personal property belonging to the county, including property acquired by
tax deed, it may sell the property without further notice by public or
vate sale upon such terms and conditions as the county deems necessary. Distribution of the proceeds of sale shall be as set forth in subsection ( 2) of
this section.
(7) The board of county commissioners may at its discretion, when in the
county's best interest, exchange and do all things necessary to exchange any
of the real property now or hereafter held and owned
the coun
for real
property of equal value, public or private, to consolidate county real property or aid the county in the control and management or use of county real
property.
( 8)
The board of county commissioners may,
resolution, declare certain parcels of real property as odd-lot property, all or portions of which
are not needed for
c purposes and are excess to the needs of the county.
For purposes of this subsection, odd-lot property is defined as that propthat has an
or is a remnant and has value
to
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Odd-lot

may be
is estimated
licensed to appraise property in the state of Idaho. If, after thirty
days' written notice, an adjoining property owner or owners do not desire to
purchase the odd-lot property, the board of county comrnissioners may sell
the
to any other interested party for not less than the appraised
value. When a sale of odd-lot property is agreed to, a public advertisement
of the pending sale shall be published in one ( 1) edition of the newspaper as
defined in subsection ( 1) of this section, and the public shall have fif-:een
(15) days to object to the sale i:1 writing. The board of county coITL'nissioners
shall make the final determination regarding the sale of odd-lot property in
an ope:1 meeting.
(9) In addition to any other powers granted
law, the board of county
commissioners may at their discretion, grant to or exchange with the federal
government, the state of Idaho, any political subdivision or taxing district
of the state of Idaho or any local historical society which is incorporated
as an Idaho nonprofit corporation which operates primarily in the county or
maintains a museum in the county, with or without compensation, any real or
personal property or any interest in such property owned by the county or
acquired
tax deed, after adoption of a resolutio:1 by the board of county
commissioners that the grant or exchange of property is in the public interest. Notice of such grant or exchange shall be as provided in subsection
(1) of this section and the decision may be made at any regularly or specially scheduled meeting of the board of county commissioners. The execution and deli very by the county of the deed
an interest in the property shall operate to discharge and cancel all levies, lier-s and taxes made
or created for the benefit of the state,
or any other
subdivisio:1 or taxing district and to cancel all titles or claims of title includclaims of redemption to such real property asserted or existing at che
time of such conveyance. However, if the property conveyed is
ect to a
lien for one ( 1) or more unsatisfied special assessments, the lien shall continue until all special assessments have been paid in full. At no time shall
a lien for a special assessment be extinguished
to such special assess
ment
been paid in full.
property conveyed to any local historical society by the county shall revert to the county when the property is no
longer utilized for the purposes for which it was conveyed.
(10) When the county has title to mineral rights severed from the property to which they attach, and the mineral rights have value of less than
twenty-five dollars ( $25. 00) per acre, the board of county coITL'nissioners may
act to return the mineral rights to the land from which they were severed in
the following manner: the
action must appear on the agenda of a regular meeting of the board of county conunissioners; and the motion to make the
return must be adopted unanimously by the board voting in open meeting.
(11) If there are excess funds and the owner (s) of record of the property at the time the tax deed was issued on the property cannot be located,
then the
treasurer shall put all remaining excess funds in an interest-bearing trust for three ( 3) years. The county may charge for the actual
costs for performing the search, and after three (3) years, any remaining
funds shall be transferred to the county indigent fund. The levy set to fund
s
of the indigent
shall be calculated based on the
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SECTION 3. That Section 43-71
amended to read as follows:

Idaho Code, be, and the same is

43-714A
DEFINITIONS. Words a:-id terms used in this
, u:-iless the
context otherwise requires, are defined as follows:
( 1) "District" means an irrigation district organized u:-ider the provisions of title 43, Idaho Code.
(2) "Board" means the board of directors of a district.
( 3) "Treasurer" means the duly appointed officer of an irrigation district, and his or her deputies or employees. Such treasurer acts as ex officio tax collector for the purposes of this chapter.
( 4) The term "delinquent assessments II as herein used shall be deemed
and construed to include all general and special assessments and charges for
operation and maintenance, bond or loan contract payments, or other authorized expenditures, entered in irrigation district assessment rolls, not
paid when due, and collectible in the manner provided in chapter 7, title 4 3,
Idaho Code.
(5) "Facsimile" means the
or
of a:-i exact copy
from an
document.
(6) "Party in ir:.terest" means a person
partnership, corporation, business venture, or other enti
holds a val"d and
purchase contract, mortgageL BT deed of trust,
e-::cet:,t-:E-::::-V--:E-e-e-E'"="E:te:::t, _ _ _ _ _ in and for the property for which a delinquency
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( 7) "Record owner or owners" means the person or entity in whose name or
names the property stands upon the records in the county recorder's office.
Where the record owners are husband and wife at t:-ie time the notice described
in section 43-717, Idaho Code, shall issue, notice to one ( 1) spouse shall be
deemed and imputed as notice to the other spouse.
(8) "Tax certificate" means a written assignment of a district's right
to a tax deed as provided in section 43-715, Idaho Code.

SECTION 4. That Section 43-720, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
43-720.
TAX DEED -- RECITALS -- EFFECT AS EVIDENCE -- TITLE CONVEYED. The matters recited in the delinquency entry must be recited in the
deed, and such deed duly acknowledged or proved is prima facie evidence that:
( 1) Benefits were apportioned to the property as required
law or water rights were properly allocated to the property.
( 2) The assessment was levied in accordance with law.
( 3) The assessment was equalized as required by law.
(4) The assessment,
with statutory penalties, interest and
any other
s, was unpaid.
( 5 J At the proper time the
was made as prescribed
law and
the proper officer.
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( 7) The person who executed the tax deed was the proper officer. Such
deed
acknowledged and proved is prima facie evidence of the regularity of all other proceedings for the assessment, inclusive, up to the exe
cution of the deed. The deed conveys to the grantee the absolute title to
the lands described therein, free of all encurr,brancesL except ourchase contracts, mortgages, deeds of trust or leases of record to the holders of which
notice as has not been sent as in this chapter provided,
any lien
for assessments wh"ch that have attached subsequent to the assessment rein the issuance of the tax deedL and
any lien for state and
county taxes. For ourposes of this section, the term" encumbrances" does not
include any easements, highways or rights-of-wav of any tyoe, whether public
or orivate.
Any number of
of land in the same district may be included
in one (1) deed where the certificates are held
one (1) person, or the district.
SECTION 5. That Section 50-1823, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
50-1823.
TP..X DEED -- FORM AND CONTENTS -- TITLE CONVEYED. The matters
recited in the
entry must be recited in the deed to the
, and
such deed duly acknowledged or
shall be prima facie evidence in that:
( 1) the
was assessed as
red by law; ( 2) that the
was
equalized as required by law; ( 3) that the assessments were levied in accordance with law; (4) that the assessments were
; (5) that at the proper
time the delinquency
was made as prescribed
law and
the proper officer; (6) that the property was unredeemed; (7) that the person who executed
the deed was the proper officer of the city. Such deed duly acknowledged and
proved shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings for
the assessments up to and including the execution and deli very of the deed.
The said deed shall convey to the grantee the abssL.:te title "'.:o tl".e lands de
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SECTION 6. That Section 63-201, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to read as follows:
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63-201.
DEFINITIONS. As used for property tax purposes in chapters 1
through 23, title 63, Idaho Code, the terms defined in this section shall
have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates another
meaning:
( 1) "Appraisal" means an estimate of
value for property tax
purposes.
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(a)
value to
ace the val 1.:e on
any assessment
estimation must be made
the assessor
or a certified property tax appraiser.
(b) For the purpose of estimating property value to present for an appeal filed
to sections 63-501A, 63-407 and 63-409, Idaho Code,
the value estimation may be made
the assessor, a certified property
tax appraiser, a licensed appraiser, or a certified appraiser or any
party as specified by law.
(2) "Bargeline" means those water
ion
, boats, barges,
lighters and other equipment and property used in conjunctio'.1 with waterways
for bulk transportation of freight or ship assist.
( 3)
"Cogenerators" means facilities which
electric energy, and steam or forms of useful energy wt'"' ch
corrunercial, heating or cooling purposes.
( 4)
"Collection costs" are amounts authorized
law to be added after
the date of delinquency and collected in the same manner as property tax.
(5) "Credit card" means a card or device, whether known as a credit card
or by any other name, issued under an arrangement pursuar:.t to which a card issuer
ves to a cardholder the privilege of
credit from the card
issuer or other person in purchasing or leasing property or services, obtai
loans, or otherwise.
(6)
"Debit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a
debit card or
any other name, issued with or without a fee
an issuer for
the use of the cardholder in depos
or trans
funds.
(7)
"Delinquency" means any
tax, special assessment, fee,
collection cost, or charge collected in the same manner as property tax, that
has not been
in the manner and within the time limits
law.
(8)
"Electronic funds transfer" means any transfer of funds that is
initiated
electronic means, such as an electronic terminal, telephone,
, ATM or magnetic tape.
(9) "Fixtures" means those articles that, al
once movable chattels, have become accessory to and a part of improve;11.ents to real property
by having been physically incorporated therein or annexed or affixed thereto
in such a manner that removing them would cause material injury or damage to
the real property, the use or purpose of such articles is integral to the use
of the real property to which it is affixed, and a person would reasonably
be considered to intend to make the articles permanent additions to the real
property. "Fixtures" includes systems for the heating, air conditioning,
ventilation, sanitation, lighting and plumbing of such building.
(10) "Floating home" means a floating structure that is designed and
built to be used, or is modified to be used, as a stationary waterborne resi
dential
( 11) "Improvements" means all buildings,
structures, manufactured
homes, as defined in section 39-4105(8), Idaho Code, mobile homes as defined in section 39-4105 (9), Idaho Code, and modular buildings, as defined
in section 39-4301 (7), Idaho Code, erected upon or affixed to land, fences,
water ditches constructed for mining, manufacturing or irrigation purposes,
fixtures, and floating homes, whether or not such improvements are owned
separately from the ownership of the land upon or to which the same may be
erected, affixed or attached. The term "
" also includes all
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trees
vines
nursery stock.
"Late charge" means a charge of two percent (2%) of

( 12)
delinquency.
(13) "Lawful money of the United States" means currency and coin of the
United States at par value and checks and drafts ·,,hish that are payable in
dollars of the United States at par value, payable upon demand or presentment.
( 14) "Legal tender" means lawful money as defined in subsection ( 13) of
this section.
(15) "Market value" means the amount of United States dollars or equivalent for which, in all probabil
a property would exchange hands between a
willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer,
with a reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a
reasonable down or full cash payment.
(16) "Operating property" means real and personal property operated
in connection with any public utility, railroad or private railcar fleet,
wholly or partly within this state, and which property is necessary to the
maintenance and operation of the public utility, railroad or private rail car
fleet, and the roacs or lines thereof, and includes all rights
accompanied
title; roadbeds; tracks; pipelines; bargelines; equipment and
docks; terminals; rolling stock; equipment; power stations; power sites;
lands; reservoirs, generating
s, transmission lines, distribution
lines and substations; and all title and interest in such property, as owner,
lessee or otherwise. The term includes electrical generation plants under
construction, whether or not owned by or operated in connection with any
• For the purpose of the appraisal, assessment and taxation of
, pursuant to chapter 4, title 63, Idaho Code, the value of
personal property shall be excluded from the taxable value of opproperty in accordance with the provisions of section 63-6021, Idaho
Code, and the value of personal property, other than intangible personal
property, shall be excluded from the taxable value of operating
in
accordance with the provisions of section 63-602KK, Idaho Code.
( 17) "Party in interest II means a person who holds a
recorded
purchase contract, mortgage, deed of trustL er security interes
lease upon the property.
For purposes of notice requirements in section
63-1009, Idaho Code, recording includes documents recorded in full or by
memorandum orovidina notice thereof.
( 18) "Person" means any entity, individual, corporation, partnership,
firm, association, limited liability company, limited liability partnership or other such entities as recognized
the state of Idaho.
(19) "Personal property" means everything that is the subject of ownership and that is not included within the term "real property. 11
(20) "Private railcar fleet" means railroad cars or locomotives owned
by, leased to, occupied by or franchised to any person other than a railroad
company operating a line of railroad in Idaho or any company classified as a
railroad by the interstate commerce commission and entitled to possess such
railroad cars and locomotives except those possessed solely for the purpose
of
, rehabilitation or remanufacturing of such locomotives or railroad cars .
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included within federal law, bargelines, and water companies which are under the urisdiction
of the Idaho public utilities commission. The term also includes telephone
corporations, as that term is defined in section 62-603, Idaho Code, except
as hereinafter provided, whether or not such telephone corporation has been
issued a certificate of convenience and necessity by the Idaho public utilities commission.
This term does not include cogenerators, mobile telephone service or
corr.panies, nor does it include pager service or companies,
when such
services are an integral
of services provided by a certificated utility
company, nor does the term "public utility" include
s or persons
engaged in the business of providing solely on a resale basis, any telephone
or teleco:m,_'Tlunication service ~ that is purchased from a telephone corporation or company.
( 22) "Railroad" means every kind of railway, whether its line of rails
or tracks be at, above or below the surface of the earth, and without regard
to the kind of power used in moving its rolling stock, and shall be considered to include every kind of street railway, suburban
or interurban railway excepting facilities established solely for maintenance and rebuilding of railroad cars or locomotives.
(23) "Real property" means land and all rights and privileges thereto
belonging or any way appertaining, all quarries and fossils in and under the
land, and all other property wtioh
the law defines, or the courts may interpret, declare and hold to be real property under the letter, spirit, intent and meaning of the law, improvements and all standing timber thereon,
including
timber owned separately from the
of the land
upon which the same may stand, except as modified in
17, title 63,
Idaho Code. Timber, forest, forest land, and forest products shall be defined as provided in chapter 1 7, title 63, Idaho Code.
( 24) "Record owner" means the person or persons in whose name or names
the property stands upon the records of the county recorder's office. Where
the record owners are husband and wife at the time of notice of pending is sue
of tax deed, notice to one ( 1) shall be deemed and imputed as notice to the
other spouse.
(25) "Special assessment" means a charge imposed upon property for a
specific purpose, collected and enforced in the same manner as property
taxes.
(26) "System value" means the market value for assessment purposes of
the operating property when considered as a unit.
( 27) "Tax code area" means a geographical area made up of one ( 1) or more
taxing districts with one ( 1) total
within the geographic area, except
as otherwise provided by law.
( 28) "Taxing district II means any entity or unit with the statutory authori ty to levy a property tax.
(29) "Taxable value" means market value for assessment purposes, less
applicable exemptions or other statutory provisions.
( 30) "Transient personal property" is personal property, specifically
such construction, logging or mining machinery and equipment which is kept,
, hauled into or
for
ods of not
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(30)
s than
, in rno2.:"e -t:han one ( 1)
state
the same year.
(31) "Warrant of distraint" means a warrant ordering the seizure of personal
to enforce
property tax, special assessment, expense, fee, collection cost
collected in the same manner as personal property tax.
SECTION 7. That Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby
amended to r:ead as follows:
63-1009.

EFFECT OF TAX DEED AS CONVEYANCE. The deed conveys to the
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or owners, provided that the title conveyed by the deed shall be free of any
recorded purchase contract, mortgaae, deed of trust, securitv interest,
lien, or lease, so long as notice has been sent to the party in interest as
provided in sections 63-201(17) and 63-1005, Idaho Code, and the lien for
property taxes, assessments, charges, interest, and penal ties for which the
lien is foreclosed and in satisfaction of which the property 's sold.
SECTION 8. An emergency exi
therefor, which emergency is hereby
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after
its passage and approval.
a clarification of exis
law, the
sature does not view the
cation of this ame;1dmeDt to
or conveyances
as retroactive legislation. In any event, the Legislature expressly intends that these amendments shal be
to
to any and all
conveyances
tax deed,
or future~

